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RETRIBUTIVISM AND JUSTICE
by Thomas H. Morawetz*
I. THE JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT
In two respects legal scholarship mirrors legal pedagogy. First, ef-
fective teaching demands description of how things are, explanation of
why they are as they are and consideration of how they can be justified.
Similarly, scholarship is often designed to explain as well as describe
and to explain in such a way as to provoke normative questions about
how things should be.
For some legal topics the relevant normative questions are pat-
terned and predictable. The justification of punishment is one such
topic. The competing theories are familiar and are the subject of most
students' first immersion in the subject. Familiarity may however be a
disguise for confusion. This observation brings us to the second shared
goal of scholarship and teaching. Both may provoke the student and the
reader to look behind the familiar forms of justification and ask
whether these familiar forms really make sense.
The simplest theory of the justification of punishment is met in the
law student's first brush with criminal law. This theory says that crimi-
nal punishment serves four goals: to incapacitate offenders (special de-
terrence), to give a general disincentive for crime (general deterrence),
to rehabilitate, and to achieve retribution! The first three goals are
identified as forward-looking in contrast with the problematic fourth.
The first three goals are forward-looking in that special deterrence,
general deterrence, and rehabilitation describe goals that are part of a
picture of a future in which persons collectively are better off. The de-
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. A.B. 1963, Harvard; J.D. 1968;
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My seven years at the University of Connecticut have been years of transition from scholar-
ship and teaching in pure philosophy to the application of philosophy to law. I am indebted in
countless ways to Dean Phillip Blumberg for his support and for easing that transition. This arti-
cle is an attempt to illustrate as coherently as possible the role of philosophy in contemporary
thinking about criminal law.
1. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw 21-25 (1972).
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terrence of crime and the rehabilitation of offenders help create a fu-
ture in which overall happiness is maximized and the pursuit of individ-
ual goals is facilitated. This form of justification is normally called
utilitarian.2
Retribution is problematic because it is not forward-looking and
therefore seems to certain critics an irrational goal. Some of these crit-
ics contend that retribution is revenge, that it reflects the domination of
emotion over reason.3 This argument can be met by saying that reason-
able persons have shared standards for determining the just deserts of
offenders, 4 and that retribution is really another term for justice. Al-
though this argument may establish the rationality of justice, it does
not make it a forward-looking consideration. Justice is the test of the
thing that should be done regardless of consequences. It is a rectifica-
tion demanded by the past rather than a "making better" determined
by the future. This apparent opposition between two modes of moral
justification is familiar and deep-seated. To the forward-looking theo-
rist, only anticipations of a desirable future can justify punishment. To
the theorist who invokes justice (the retributivist), any theory that does
not entail just treatment is morally groundless. The very idea of a com-
promise that embraces all four goals is unacceptable to either side. A
middle way is suspect to the extent that these methodological stand-
points seem irreconcilable.
One can, of course, try to shrug the problem away. One can move
to the level of intuitions about acceptable results in particular cases and
embrace a kind of eclecticism in method, a middle way by default.'
This consists in middle-level generalizations from particular intuitions.
For example, if deterrence is most effective when a minor but wide-
spread offense like shoplifting is punished severely, justice may still re-
quire that punishments be scaled to what is fair even if deterrence is
compromised. But a series of such observations may not yield much of
2. The term "utilitarianism" originated in the work of Jeremy Bentham. The forms of utilita-
rianism are described superbly well by J.J.C. Smart in Smart, Utilitarianism, 8 THE ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF PHILOSOPHY 206-12 (1967). In the text accompanying note 54, infra, I discuss the rela-
tionship between the terms "utilitarian" and "forward-looking" as characterizations of theories.
3. See T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 29 (971). Honderich
quot s critically F. STEPHENS, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 161 (1873): "(Punishment ex-
ists] for the sake of gratifying the feeling of hatred-call it revenge, resentment, or what you
will-which the contemplation of such conduct excites in healthily constituted minds."
4. See J. KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 115-29 (1973).
5. See, e.g.. B. WILLIAMS, Conflicts of Values and The Truth in Relativism, in MORAL LUCK
71-82, 132-43 (1981); T. NAGEL, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128-41
(1979).
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a general theory even if it describes intuitions particularly well. It is the
nature of theoretical investigation to view eclecticism with suspicion, to
view it as capitulation in the face of difficulty. Eclecticism is the theo-
rist's admission of failure unless the theorist's job is reconceived not as
the job of finding a theory but of finding out whether it is possible to
find a theory.6
The merits of eclecticism are peripheral to my main concerns. My
questions will be methodological as well as substantive. They will draw
upon a remark made by H.L.A. Hart in a context having nothing to do
with the theory of punishment. In his recent criticism of Dworkin,
Hart says that "a satisfactory foundation for a theory. . will [not] be
found as long as the search is conducted in the shadow of utilitarian-
ism." 8 Debates about punishment continue to be conducted in this
shadow whether they involve its acceptance, its rejection, or the quest
for a middle way between utilitarianism and retributivism. My critique
of these debates has two parts. I shall first show how theoreticians
gravitate to one or the other pole as a consequence of taking the opposi-
tion seriously. I shall then question the very idea that there is an irrec-
oncilable opposition between the two polar modes of justification and
give reasons for thinking it a myth.
II. FOUR THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
Four influential theories of punishment are attempts to come to
terms with the classical goals of criminal law. Three of the four are
trapped on the horns of the methodological dilemma. They take seri-
ously only one of the modes of justification and distort or disregard the
other pole of debate.
A. Quinton. The Logic of Retributivism
In his important article, On Punishment," Anthony Quinton argues
that retributivism has been misconceived. In his view, retributivism is
reconcilable with forward-looking theories because it is simply making
a logical point while forward looking theories make an ethical point, a
point about justification. First, Quinton interprets retributivism as de-
6. See T. NAGEL, supra note 5. Nagel is especially illuminating on this point.
7. H.L.A. HART, Between Utility and Rights, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
198-222 (1983).
8. Id. at 222.
9. Quinton, On Punishment, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 55-64 (H.B. Acton ed.
1969).
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manding that a person be guilty before he may be punished. He ac-
knowledges that a pure forward-looking theory could dispense with this
limitation. The overall economy of deterrence might be such that pun-
ishment is most effective when those who are generally believed to be
guilty are punished (as scapegoats) along with those who are really
guilty. For Quinton, any conflict is illusory because the retributivist
does not intend his limitation to have ethical force. Quinton states that
the necessity of not punishing the innocent is not moral but
logical. It is not, as some retributivists think, that we may not
punish the innocent and ought only to punish the guilty, but
that we cannot punish the innocent and must only punish the
guilty. Of course, the suffering or harm in which punishment
consists can be and is inflicted on innocent people but this is
not punishment, it is judicial error or terrorism or . . . 'social
surgery.' The infliction of suffering on a person is only prop-
erly described as punishment if that person is guilty. The re-
tributivist thesis, therefore, is not a moral doctrine, but an ac-
count of the meaning of the word 'punishment'. 10
Quinton's theory, however, fails because it misses the retribu-
tivist's point and confuses a description of the conditions of punishment
with a justification of punishment. It is correct descriptively to say that
guilt is a condition of punishment. The institution or practice of punish-
ing has this as a pervasive and unexceptionable feature. But this is not
the retributivist's point. The retributivist claims that to be justified
morally, punishment may be imposed only on the guilty. He identifies
justice with this feature and says that any practice that lacks it a forti-
ori lacks justification.
The same point can be made somewhat differently. Quinton writes
as if restricting punishment to the guilty were merely a feature internal
to the practice of punishment. This characterization, however, does not
answer the utilitarian's challenge that punishment need not be limited
to the guilty because the challenge is made from outside the practice
and has the form, why this practice and not another? Quinton notwith-
standing, the retributivist, like the utilitarian, makes a normative and
not a logical point.
Quinton cannot succeed in defusing the retributivist claim or the
utilitarian challenge because the retributivist's purpose cannot be to de-
10. Id. at 58-59.
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scribe a contingent internal feature of the system of punishment. This
point can be seen in terms of the link between retribution and justice.
If the retributivist merely identified retribution with punishment condi-
tioned on guilt, he could be interpreted as offering a description with-
out normative intent. He could be uncommitted on whether retribution
in this sense is desirable. But to describe the connection between pun-
ishment and guilt as a requirement of justice is to make a normative
claim. If the connection is an essential feature of justice, then a system
that lacks this feature is unjust. For the retributivist, the aspirations of
a justificatory theory framed in nonretributive terms are incoherent.
The retributivist, thus, leaves us not with the task of finding a justifica-
tion other than justice, but with the task of understanding what it could
possibly mean to justify a system of punishment while conceding the
irrelevance of justice.
Quinton avoids the choice between the two modes of justification
only by declining to identify tie retributivist claim as one of justice.
Once the retributivist claim is so identified, the abyss between the two
modes seems unbridgeable. Quinton defends utilitarianism by interpret-
ing retributivism as a noncompetitor.
B. Rawls: Rule-Utilitarianism
"Two Concepts of Rules,""1 John Rawls' early and influential arti-
.cle, directly addresses punishment. It is concerned with utilitarian justi-
fication and puts forth an ingenious model called "rule-utilitarian-
ism."'12 Under this model, "one must distinguish between justifying a
practice as a system of rules to be applied and enforced, and justifying
a particular action which falls under these rules; utilitarian arguments
are appropriate with regard to questions about practices, while retribu-
tive arguments fit the application of particular rules to particular
cases.".
13
Utilitarian justification has this limited role because the system it-
self is found to work better when actors within the system may consult
only the rules and need not make utilitarian judgments. The obvious
analogy is to games: the game of baseball serves utilitarian ends, but
11. Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in CONTFtPORARY UTILITARANIsMi 59-98 (M. Bayles ed.
1968).
12. The tenets of rule-utilitarianism were first spelled out by J. 0. Urmson in Urmson, The
Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill, in MILL: A CoLucETiON or CRiTICAL Es-
sAys 179-89 (J. B. Schneewind ed. 1968).
13. Rawls, supra note 11, at 62.
1984]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
only when the players follow the rules without claiming exceptions
(take a fourth strike) whenever utility would prescribe the exception in
the individual case.14 Rawls' theory suggests rules of justice are inter-
nal rules like the three strike limit. They cannot be waived for reasons
of utility in the individual case, but only because the package of rules
serves utility effectively as a package.' 5
Rawls further explains this theory by comparing the role of judge
and legislator.
[T]he judge and the legislator stand in different positions and
look in different directions: one to the past, the other to the
future. The justification of what the judge does, qua judge,
sounds like the retributive view; the justification of what the
(ideal) legislator does, qua legislator, sounds like the utilita-
rian view. Thus both views have a point . . . and one's initial
confusion disappears once one sees that these views apply to
persons holding different offices with different duties, and situ-
ated differently with respect to the system of rules that make
up the criminal law. . . . One reconciles the two views by the
time-honored device of making them apply to different
situations. 6
Rawls, like Quinton, offers two levels of analysis, internal and ex-
ternal. Unlike Quinton, however, he does not confuse this distinction
with the distinction between description and normative justification. 7
By distinguishing the internal move of justifying a particular action
within a practice (a particular application of a rule) from the external
move of justifying the practice itself as a system of rules, Rawls allo-
cates the two modes of justification to different domains. Justice (retri-
bution) becomes a virtue of the application of rules, and forward-look-
ing (utilitarian) considerations justify the choice of rules.
It is important to see why Rawls' theory fails. The theory makes
the existence of just treatment a provisional consideration of a fully
justified practice. Just treatment is a feature of a system that, qua sys-
tem, is justified by considerations other than justice, and these other
14. 1 discuss this analogy to games in Morawetz, The Concept of a Practice, in PHILOSOPHIi-
CAL STUDIES 209-26 (1973) and in T. MORAWETZ, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 46-51 (1980).
15. See Rawls, supra note 11, at 76-77. See also Urmson, supra note 12. Urmson's discussion
is full and clear.
16. Rawls, supra note 11, at 63-65.
17. Rawls' distinction is between two compatible kinds of justification. He concedes the nor-
mative force of each kind.
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(forward-looking) considerations have conceptual priority. As Rawls re-
alizes by the time he writes A Theory of Justice,8 justice cannot be
purely an intrasystemic criterion of normative criticism. If it makes
sense to assess an application of a rule as just, it also makes sense to
refer to the rule itself as just (in its general application). If there are
just rules, there are also just systems of rules. The notion of moral
justification is not severable, and the moral standpoints of intrasystemic
participant and extrasystemic observer (judge and legislator) are not
distinct.19 Justice makes the same claim on both.
Many theorists offer a different criticism of rule-utilitarianism.
They complain that the rule-utilitarian could countenance a general
practice of secretly punishing the innocent. 20 According to this claim,
Rawls could get counterintuitive results because punishing the innocent
violates an intuition that we all accept: the innocent should not be pun-
ished. A rule-utilitarian like Rawls may reject the suggestion that he
would countenance a system in which the innocent are officially sanc-
tioned and the public is kept in ignorance of this in four ways. As a
preliminary matter he might say that such examples are farfetched and
unpersuasive and that bad examples make bad theory.21 He may then
attack the example on its facts. He may say there is an ineradicable
risk that such a policy would become known and that public confidence
and obedience would be dramatically threatened. This reply, however,
is pragmatic rather than principled, and seems to concede the objec-
tion. Under this defense, the rule-utilitarian would approve of the situa-
tion if in theory the risk could be eliminated.
The utilitarian's third and fourth responses are more interesting.
The third response is that the weight that must be assigned to harming
the innocent-the subjective disappointment, the pain of unfair treat-
ment-is so great that it necessarily outweighs whatever benefits the
practice may yield. The suggestion here is that even if the utilitarian
adheres to the criteria of evaluation most often associated with utilita-
18. J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSICE (1971). By this time, Rawls has explicitly rejected utili-
tarian forms of justification and puts forth an account of justice as a concept to be deployed in
criticism from an external standpoint. Id. at 22-53.
19. The inapplicability of Rawls' model to justification as it occurs in "open" practices like
law (as opposed to "closed" practices like games) is the main subject of my paper, The Concept of
a Practice supra note 14.
20. For this and other examples of objections to utilitarianism, see Williams, A Critique of
Utilitarianism, in JJ.C. SMART & B. VILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM %: FOR AND AGAINsT 77-150
(1973).
21. See Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, in ETmics 186-210 (JJ. Thomson & G. Dwor-
kin eds. 1968).
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rianism and speaks of maximizing happiness or satisfaction,22 it is open
to him to make interpersonal comparisons in various ways. It is open,
that is, to say that the disappointment of the punished innocents has
such intensity and such qualities that it has overwhelming, decisive
weight.23 The final response is for the utilitarian to adopt nonstandard
criteria of evaluation and to speak not of happiness and subjective sat-
isfaction, but of well-being and the common good. He is then in posi-
tion to conclude that a regime of injustice cannot serve the common
good.
The third and fourth responses are opening shots in a theoretical
dialogue. The third response, it will be objected, throws justice out the
front door only to admit it through the back by saying that special and
decisive weight should be assigned by the utilitarian to the sense of
justice outraged. The final response merely puts in question what terms
of utility determination or forward-looking evaluation are satisfactory.
C. Hart: A Multiplicity of Values
Both Quinton and Rawls seek to accommodate the notion of jus-
tice within a utilitarian framework. Although Rawls' theory fares bet-
ter than Quinton's, both undervalue and misrepresent the apparent role
of justice in normative reasoning. H.L.A. Hart, in his extensive writ-
ings on punishment and criminal responsibility, 24 offers a theory super-
ficially similar to Rawls' but one that is more sensitive to the impera-
tives of the competing modes of justification.
Hart says that a "morally tolerable" theory of punishment must
be "a compromise between distinct and partly conflicting principles." 2
Hart, therefore, distinguishes the "general justifying aim" of punish-
ment-crime minimization through general as well as specific deter-
rence-from its secondary aim, the distribution of punishment. 20 Jus-
tice is relevant to only the second of these problems while deterrence is
22. Utilitarianism, as propounded by Mill and Bentham, speaks of the greatest happiness for
the greatest number. In the twentieth century, utilitarians have frequently refined these references
to ones about "want satisfaction" and "preference satisfaction." See, e.g., Gauthier, On the Refu-
tation of Utilitarianism, in THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 144-63 (H. Miller & W. Williams
eds. 1982).
23. See T. MORAWETZ, supra note 14, at 101-06.
24. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968), collects Hart's various papers
and essays on criminal law.
25. Id. at I.
26. Id. at 8-13. Hart is usually careful to be agnostic about whether the general justifying aim
of criminal law goes beyond deterrence and crime minimization to include other goals and values.
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relevant to both. Thus, in particular cases, the degree of punishment
must be determined by a variety of criteria so that it is exemplary,
proportionate, and fair all at the same time.
Commentators have found Hart's theory ambiguous. Certain
passages make Hart sound much like a rule-utilitarian. He says, for
example, that
[f]airness between different offenders expressed in terms of
different punishments is not an end in itself, but a method of
pursuing other aims which has indeed a moral claim on our
attention; and we should give effect to it where it does not
impede the pursuit of the main aims of punishment."1
Hart adds that "justice is a method of doing other things, not a sub-
stantive end." '28 These passages suggest that deterrence is the end while
justice is the means. They also suggest that deterrence is the external
justification while justice remains a counter used internally by players
of the game. Just treatment is justified only as long as, and to the ex-
tent that, it serves the external end.
This Rawlsian reading, however, is not the most plausible reading
of Hart, who also argues time and again that the unwillingness to be
unjust, for example to punish scapegoats in the interest of forward-
looking considerations like deterrence, is based on independent values.
This unwillingness "would still remain even if we were certain that in
the case of the 'punishment' of one who had not broken the law the fact
of his innocence would not get out or would not cause great alarm if it
did." 29
Hart's theory is distinguishable from Rawls' view because it makes
use of what Nozick calls "side constraints."30 Under this view, utilita-
rian goals cannot be pursued in ways that violate justice, not because
rules of justice are provisionally or contingently the best rules for pur-
suing utility, but because they represent an independent value that lim-
its such pursuit. Hart concludes that "the pursuit of a single social aim
• . . has its restrictive qualifier" and that "our main social institutions
always possess a plurality of features which can only be understood as
27. Id. at 172-73.
28. H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 54 (1964).
29. H.L.A. HART, supra note 24, at 77-78.
30. See R. NoZICK, ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA 28-33 (1974). Nozick observes: "The side-
constraint view forbids you to violate. . . moral constraints in the pursuit of your goals." Id. at
29.
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a compromise between partly discrepant principles."' 31 Most simply,
this means that the distinctive aim of criminal law, the control and
minimization of crime, is pursued in the context of other values. Al-
though these values are affected by what we do with criminal law, they
are not unique to or distinctive of criminal law.
D. An Expanded Version of Retribution
The three theories considered so far all identify one theme with
retributivism: punishment must be fair or just, and therefore limited to
those who are guilty. This theme is offered as a constraint on the pur-
suit of forward-looking goals. In other words, under these theories fair-
ness is a necessary condition for punishing, but it is not a sufficient
condition. Forward-looking goals must also be served.
A true retributivist, on the other hand, argues that considerations
of desert (or justice) are sufficient to justify punishing. Thus, while
Hart clearly invokes justice to safeguard the rights of potential subjects
of punishment, a true retributivist invokes retributivism to emphasize
the right of "society" 32 to punish offenders with a suitable degree of
severity. As we have seen, Hart sees guilt as a threshold condition for
punishment. For him, the application of punishment must not only be
justly deserved (i.e., only the guilty may be punished and only with
severity no greater than the seriousness of the offense), but it must also
serve the "general justifying aim" of furthering common ends.
In order to evaluate retributivism we must try to separate the prin-
ciple of retribution from the principle of justice. There is no need to do
so if we are considering only the requirement that punishment be lim-
ited to the guilty; this may be called either a requirement of retribution
or one of justice. But we must consider two additional requirements
often identified with the notion of retribution, namely (a) that the state
be seen as having a duty to punish the guilty and (b) that intuitions of
proportionality set a lower limit as well as an upper limit to the severity
of punishment.3 3 Although these requirements are implicit in the notion
of retribution, they are, as we shall see, not necessarily requirements of
justice.
Three aspects of this expanded version of retributivism are imme-
31. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 24, at 10 (emphasis added).
32. Many political philosophers suggest that rights belong to individuals rather than collectivi-
ties. See generally A. GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS 1-19 (1982); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 90-94 (1978).
33. See, e.g., T. HONDERICH, supra note 3, at 22-23.
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diately apparent.
(1) This scheme makes no appeal to forward-looking considera-
tions as justification. It may be said to have benefits from a forward-
looking standpoint, but it is not justified in terms of those benefits.
(2) These principles are echoed in statutory schemes of sentencing,
in the announced aims of sentencers, and in the expectations of layper-
sons.m It is often said, virtually as a truism, that the guilty should be
punished and punished with sentences they deserve.
(3) These principles do not match legal practice, where many
norms flout retributive guidelines. Defendants may buy immunity from
prosecution by choosing to incriminate their associates. Prosecutions
are dropped and convictions overturned when the state violates the stat-
utory or constitutional rights of "guilty" defendants.3 5 The first of these
practices may be justified only by expediency, but the latter is typical
of a large class of practices justified by accepted principle.
The expanded version of retributivism carries a long tail of contro-
versy; it is easy to see why. Although the processes of pleading and trial
are designed to separate the guilty from the innocent, other aspects of
criminal law show the artificiality and the idealization involved in this
separation. Criminal law everywhere recognizes a range of excusing
and mitigating conditions, and it recognizes that each condition ex-
presses a heterogeneous mix of situations and dispositions.30 The aware-
ness that many offenders are at the cusp of excusability should make us
wary of claiming that there is a duty to punish the guilty as a discrete
and isolable class. The same awareness of heterogeneity should make
us see how unclear it is to claim that the punishment should fit the
seriousness of the offense. Is seriousness measured by the amount of
harm caused, the amount of harm intended, the atrocious character of
the offense as opposed to the degree of harm,37 or the degree of com-
mitment, ambivalence, or remorse of the offender?
These problems are not fatal to the retributivist view. We all in
34. Consider, for example, § 1170 of the CAL. PENAL CODE (1976 amendment) (West Supp.
1984): "The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punish-
ment. This purpose is best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with
provision for uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense under similar
circumstances."
35. The development of this practice under the U.S. Constitution is documented and explained
in MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE chs. 5, 10, & I1 (Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel eds., 5th
ed. 1980).
36. See, e.g., G. WILUAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART Chs. 8, 10, I, 17, & 18 (2d
ed. 1961).
37. See J. KLEINIG, supra note 4, at 123-29.
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fact rank instances of offensive conduct using the language of compara-
tive seriousness.3 8 We sympathize with the duty to punish the guilty as
long as we understand it to refer to those who are morally as well as
legally guilty. Jeffrie Murphy has argued that both utilitarianism and
retributivism are based on evident principle and not merely disputable
intuitions or emotions. "That the maximization of social utility is im-
portant is no more obviously true than that a man should not unfairly
profit from his own criminal wrongdoing. . . ."" Murphy goes on to
remark that retributivism draws its theoretical underpinnings from that
aspect of justice that deals with reciprocity. Kant also identified retri-
bution with reciprocity when he argued that criminal law exists to pre-
vent those who disobey the rules of conduct from gaining an unfair
advantage over those who obey.40
The Kantian view has not stood unchallenged. We have seen that
retributivism and the underlying theory of reciprocity underestimate
the mix of offenders. Not all offenders seek to profit from crime, and
some who seek to profit do not achieve any gain, even when punishment
is left wholly out of account. The notion of reciprocity between the
criminal and society or between the criminal and her victim is a meta-
phor drawn from a relationship that is both simpler and different.4 1
Although justice requires reciprocity in the case of an actual compact
or within a small group with voluntary and mutual undertakings, it is
much less clear what justice requires under the conditions of an actual
criminal offense.
In this section I have indicated the gravitational force of the utili-
tarian and retributive modes of moral justification, and the difficulty of
imagining and defending a middle way. Quinton and Rawls exemplify
the utilitarian or forward-looking mode while Hart offers an account
that gives sound attention to both modes without trying to reconcile
them at the theoretical level. Quinton and Rawls give insufficient atten-
tion to the extrasystemic role of justice. Retributivism, in the form con-
sidered here, may be at odds with justice. Although justice is congruent
with the weak form of retributivism which merely asserts that only the
guilty should be eligible for punishment, it is not obviously congruent
38. Id. at 115-29.
39. J. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 79 (1979) (emphasis deleted).
40. I. KArr, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 36-39 (J. Ladd trans. 1965) (translation
Of METAPHYSISCHE ANFANGSGRUNDE DER RECHTSLEHRE (1797)).
41. The use of such metaphors and of this style of reasoning is criticized persuasively by
M.B.E. Smith in Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950
(1973).
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with a stronger form of retributivism, which asserts that there is a duty
to punish the guilty with fitting severity.
III. TOWARD A NEW METHODOLOGY
The opposition between forward-looking justifications and justice
as justification can be bridged not by eclecticism but by reconceiving
the terms of a forward-looking theory. Only in this way can reasoning
about punishment emerge from "the shadow of utilitarianism," from a
context in which familiar forms of utilitarianism are swallowed whole,
rejected, or adopted with demarcated constraints.
A forward-looking theory will be incomplete as long as it fails to
consider every effect the practice of punishing has on the common
good. The effects of criminal adjudication and punishment on the inci-
dence of crime are surely the first effects that come to mind, but there
are others. Hart reminds us that the public process of trial and convic-
tion affirms values that bind society.42 A society in which stable stan-
dards of punishment generally reflect and reinforce moral values is one
in which persons rest secure in their capacity to act and plan, and in
which they experience little discontinuity between public events and
private expectations. The notion of the common good is not severable
from the notion of a society with these latter characteristics.
The best discussion of the social benefits of punishment is in Joel
Feinberg's essays, "Justice and Personal Desert" and "The Expressive
Function of Punishment."43 Feinberg draws attention to what he calls
natural responsive attitudes to the actions of others. For example, he
notes the congruity-logical as well as emotive-between gratitude and
kindness, resentment and intentional injury. Feinberg asserts that there
is a natural fit between "one person's actions or qualities and another
person's responsive attitudes." 44 These responsive attitudes are the
foundations of a shared sense of what treatment persons deserve; they
owe nothing to forward-looking goals. But, Feinberg notes, considera-
tion of the common good "give[s] a reason (in addition to natural incli-
nation) for expressing . . . our attitudes and appraisals" in such insti-
tutions as criminal adjudication and punishment.4  Individual
responsive attitudes and institutional criteria for decision-making mutu-
ally reinforce and condition one another. Feinberg notes that whether
42. H.L.A. HART, supra note 24, at 169-73, 182-85.
43. J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 55-94, 95-118 (1970).
44. Id. at 82.
45. Id. at 83.
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or not symbolic public disapproval helps or hinders deterrence and re-
form, it serves other functions that are inherent in such expression.
Among these functions are authoritative disavowal of certain kinds of
harmful conduct, vindication of the law as rooted in moral values, and
formal absolution of those who are free of blameworthy conduct. 46 It is
easy but wrong to think of these functions as means to an end and as
needing vindication in the light of some aspect of the common good.
The following argument demonstrates why no such vindication is
needed.
First, there is an important distinction between resentment and
justified disapproval.47 Unlike resentment, justified disapproval carries
with it a claim to be able to justify or demonstrate that the disapproved
conduct violates shared norms of mutual respect and dignity. Resent-
ment is a personal responsive attitude toward actions affecting oneself,
while disapproval is a responsive attitude backed by reasons and con-
cerned with actions affecting oneself or others. Resentment and justi-
fied disapproval are different categories of response-one emotive, one
cognitive-but they are responses to the same kind of action.48 Second,
there is a logical relationship between resentment or disapproval on one
hand and certain kinds of conduct on the other. What we resent or
disapprove of (and what we generally praise or blame) is not typically
arbitrary or a matter of idiosyncratic preference. Rather such judg-
ments are appeals to shared standards, to a shared sense of the com-
mon good. This is what John Rawls taps when he finds and describes
the "sense of justice. ' '49 Third, any forward-looking characterization of
the common good will describe social institutions in which the sense of
justice is realized and reinforced, not as a means to some other end but
as an indispensable aspect of living well with others. Finally, the re-
quirement that a system of punishment be just (that punishment be
allocated to the guilty and that moral blameworthiness play some role
in determining the severity of punishment) is an inherent requirement
of any characterization of the common good.
If all this is true, one of the recurrent criticisms of forward-looking
theories-that such theories fail because a system justified in forward-
46. Id. at 101-04.
47. The best treatment of this distinction and of its significance for moral philosophy is P.F.
STRAWSON, Freedom and Resentment, in FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1-25
(1974).
48. Id. at 13-16.
49. See generally J. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 453-512.
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looking terms could encompass conviction and punishment of the inno-
cent if it was generally believed that those punished were
guilty-misses the mark.50 This criticism is irrelevant because a for-
ward-looking theory is an attempt to describe a future in which the
common good is in fact secured, not one in which persons happen to
believe that the common good is secured. The criticism would suggest
itself only to someone who thought that there was no difference be-
tween reality and belief about reality. The difference, however, could
hardly be greater. One would not confuse a situation in which persons
wrongly believed that they were safe from crime with one in which
potential offenders were really deterred. One should, accordingly, keep
distinct a situation in which persons believed they lived in a just society
from one in which they were in fact treated justly.
The point here is methodological. To understand it we must distin-
guish conceptual relationships from contingent ones.5 ' For example, the
relationship between the common good and security from harm is con-
ceptual, not contingent. It is part of the notion of the common good
that persons be safe and secure, and the inquiry into why deterrence is
a desirable goal is otiose.52 The relationship between the common good
and just treatment is also conceptual and not contingent. The question
why punishment should be limited to the guilty requires no answer.
The attempt to refute the criticism on its own terms by showing that
systematic injustice would not (as a contingent matter) be balanced by
gains from enhanced deterrence, is misconceived ab initio. It is miscon-
ceived not because the empirical question is close or undecidable, but
because the empirical question is not meaningfully raised; gains in
added safety are, in principle, not the sorts of things that can justify
50. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
51. I am drawing on the familiar and highly problematic distinction between analytic (concep-
tual) truths and synthetic (contingent, empirical) truths. Very roughly, the distinction is between
propositions whose truth is apprehended through one's understanding of the meanings and uses of
the terms and to propositions whose truth is determined by inspection of empirical situations.
"Ethics is a branch of philosophy" is a proposition of the first kind while "Harold Stassen is the
Republican nominee for President" is an example of the second. The distinction has spawned
endless debate among philosophers. Among the most influential discussions are W. QuINF, Two
Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEw 20.46 (1961) and Grice & Straw-
son, In Defense of a Dogma, 65 PHIL- REv. 141-58 (1956).
52. Of course, one can describe the ways in which persons benefit from safety and security,
but those descriptions do not have explanatory value. If the value of safety and freedom from
harm is not self-evident, there's little to be said to demonstrate their value. Compare Harts dis-
cussion of the minimal content of natural law in H.L.A. HART, TIrE CoNcEsr OF LAw 189-95
(1961).
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systematic injustice. 53
The familiar opposition between maximizing the collective happi-
ness or satisfaction and satisfying justice is a chimera. Happiness and
satisfaction are understandable and realizable not in vacuo but in a
social context. The kind of happiness or satisfaction realizable in a just
context is not comparable or commensurable with happiness or satis-
faction realizable in an unjust context. The kind of happiness that is
relevant to forward-looking anticipations of the common good is neces-
sarily the former.
The term "forward-looking theory of the common good" is prefer-
able to "utilitarianism" because the latter is tainted. Throughout its
tangled history utilitarianism has been associated with the notion that
happiness or satisfaction is only contingently or accidentally related to
the moral features of a social context. A context in which the greatest
happiness is gained by the greatest number may or may not be a just
society; its justice remains to be demonstrated.54 In Hart's most recent
work he sees, I think, the vulnerability of traditional utilitarianism. He
says that we must move away from debate about "the ways in which
utilitarianism has ignored certain values taken to be uncontroversial." '
At the same time, he calls for "a more radical and detailed considera-
tion of the ways in which rights relate to other values." 5 My remarks
are intended to be in the spirit of these observations.
It may be objected that any attempt to integrate justice into a
forward-looking theory must fail. He who takes justice seriously is ob-
livious to consequences and affirms that justice be done even if the
heavens fall.57 This objection fails in two ways. First, appearances not-
withstanding, the objection does not set justice in opposition to future
consequences, but rather sets in opposition two different sets of conse-
quences, the effects of just treatment and the effects of unjust treat-
ment. In this sense, the objection itself is forward-looking. Secondly,
the on-going debate about justice and forward-looking theories is con-
53. The distinction between what is true "as a rule" and what may be true as an exception is
crucial here.
54. This position, as we have seen, is held by rule-utilitarians as well as other utilitarians. It is
compatible with this position that intuitions of what is just may be clearer than intuitions of what
is best in utilitarian terms. If that is true, the measure of just institutions by utilitarian criteria
may never be made.
55. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 195.
56. Id.
57. Fiat justitia ruat coelum, proverb attributed to Lucius Calpurnius Piso Cacsoninus [d. 43
B.C.], quoted in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, 133 (15th ed. 1980).
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cerned with on-going systems of rules (practices), not particular cases
of injustice. The objection would have to be rewritten to refer to just
rules, not to justice in a particular case. That said, one who holds the
view I have defended may concede that individual eases of injustice
may occur and need to be excused; but in principle they must remain
exceptions within a system of justice. If the objection is that the heav-
ens would fall were justice done systematically, i.e., were just rules
adopted, then it adopts a pessimism to which there is no reasonable
response.
It could also be objected that integrating justice into a forward-
looking theory absorbs the retributivist's notion that there is a duty to
punish the guilty and to do so proportionately. This objection forgets
the caveats laid out above. Justice, in my view, speaks uncertainly to
such issues. It may counsel us to distinguish among the guilty in the
light of circumstances and to weigh ameliorating or aggravating cir-
cumstances in deciding when and how to punish. The following proposi-
tions illustrate this point.
(1) A forward-looking theory of the common good will pre-
scribe a system of just rather than unjust treatment.
This, I have argued, is a conceptual matter.
(2) A just system of punishment will restrict punishment to
the guilty.
This too is a conceptual matter and not an empirical question.
(3)(a) A just system of punishment will always punish the
guilty and will punish them with severity proportionate to the
seriousness of their offenses.
This proposition is treated as conceptual by retributivists. Compare it
with the following.
(3)(b) In a just system of punishment there are ordinarily
good reasons to punish the guilty and to do so with severity
proportionate to the seriousness of their offenses.
I have suggested that (3)(b), and not (3)(a), best describes the require-
ments of justice.58 It follows from (3)(b) that whether and how an of-
fender should be punished in a particular case is a matter to be decided
on the basis of all relevant reasons.
58. It can be argued, I think, that this best fits Hart's position as wcll.
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IV. QUESTIONING THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS
The paper has one unexplained premise. It is that the most famil-
iar way of characterizing a foiward-looking theory, identified over the
decades with utilitarianism, is incoherent. To defend my premise would
bring us deeply into the epistemology of moral reasoning and is beyond
the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, an underlying characterization of
forward-looking theories, shared by both most utilitarians 9 and anti-
utilitarians, 60 can and must be described, however briefly and roughly.
By its terms, individuals are seen as entertaining life plans involving
identifiable ends (plans for maximizing happiness or satisfaction) atom-
istically.61 The ends reflect personal choices or dispositions, and they
may have any content. For the utilitarian, the point of moral reasoning
is to ascribe moral justification to the coordination of such plans to
maximize collective and cumulative satisfaction. For the anti-utilitarian
the point of moral reasoning is to uncover the appropriate constraints
on the pursuit of these ends so that each individual is accorded the
protection of respectful treatment. These constraints are, at least in
part, the constraints of justice. For the anti-utilitarian, moral justifica-
tion lies in satisfaction of the conditions set by such constraints.
To begin to see the incoherence of the traditional characterization
one must challenge the underlying picture of human experience and
aspiration. One must sketch an alternative picture, one in which the
genealogy of personal awareness of the good lies ab initio in social in-
teraction and is describable essentially in interpersonal terms of reci-
procity. It would follow that the notion of a personal good is best seen
as derived from participation in the common good and that the com-
mon good inherently involves, as I have argued, a system of just rather
than unjust treatment. A move away from the atomistic epistemologi-
cal premise is a move away from the utilitarian dialogue, a move (as
Hart would have it) out of the shadow of utilitarianism. Its elaboration
is a project for another time.
59. See, e.g., J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861); J. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1789); R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979); and D.
LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965).
60. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 94-100; J. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 22-53.
61. In other words, each person is seen as determining what shall count as her/his personal
goals and as going about maximizing the satisfaction of these goals. One individual's goals may or
may not include the empathetic realization of the goals of others to whom she/he has affective
ties.
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